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COMMENTS
HIGHLY ERRONEOUS BELIEFS DISTINGUISHED
FROM INSANE DELUSIONS IN WISCONSIN
Testamentary incapacity, which will render the provisions of a
will at least partially inoperative1 if present at the time the will is
executed,2 consists broadly of two general types: non-age, and mental
incapacity. The age requirement is statutory,3 and requires ordinarily
that a testator attain majority before attempting to effect a testa-
menary disposition by will. However, there are exceptions for minor
married women who are at least eighteen years of age, and servicemen
of any age. Mental incapacity does not enjoy a similar simplicity. The
applicable statutes4 require that the testator be "of sound mind," and
go no further in the matter. Hence, for all practical purposes, the
question of mental incapacity has been left entirely for judicial deter-
mination.
Mental incapacity is also divisible into two broad categories: general
mental derangement and the insane delusion. 5 General mental defi-
ciency may be congenital or acquired after birth by sickness, injury,
old age, etc. The Wisconsin Supreme Court began formulating a
general test at an early date6 for this type of deficiency and it is
interesting to note that little change has been wrought over the years.7
However, the modern version of the test is presented in this form:
... the test of mental competency is whether the testator had
sufficient active memory to comprehend, without prompting, the
condition of his property, his relations to those who might be
beneficiaries, and to hold these things in mind long enough to
perceive their relations to each other and to be able to form some
rational judgment in relation to them."8
1 A scarcity of cases exist on this point. There is some authority for the propo-
sition that where the insane delusions affect but a part of the will, the unaf-
fected provisions should stand. 1 Page, WILLS §159 (3d ed. 1941); 57 AI.
JUR., WILLS §87. No Wisconsin case expressly decides the issue, but in no
case to date wherein the court found an insane delusion has any portion of the
will been admitted to probate.
2 Testamentary capacity must exist at the time the will is executed. If the testa-
tor lacked the requisite capacity prior to execution, but possessed it when the
will was executed, the instrument is valid. Conversely, if testator had testa-
mentary capacity prior to the making of the will, but lacked it at execution,
the will is invalid. Where the testator becomes incapacitated subsequent to
execution, the will is nonetheless valid. Estate of Wegner, 185 Wis. 407, 201
N.W. 826 (1925) ; Estate of Kesich, 244 Wis. 374, 12 N.W.2d 688 (1943), aff'd
in Will of Klagstad, 264 Wis. Wis. 269, 58 N.W.2d 636 (1952) ; 1 Page, WILLS
§111, and cases there cited.
3 Wis. STATS. (1955) §§238.01, 238.05.
4Ibid.
5 1 Page, WILLS §135; Atkinson, WILLS §51 (2d ed. 1953).6 E.g., see Holden v. Meadows and Others, 31 Wis. 284 (1872).
7 Holden v. Meadows and Others, ibid.; In the Matter of the Will of Sarah M.
Blakely, 48 Wis. 294, 4 N.W. 337 (1880); It re Michael Lewis's Will, 51 Wis.
101, 7 N.W. 829 (1881) ; McMaster v. Scriven, 85 Wis. 162, 55 N.W. 149 (1893).
8 Will of Klagstad, stupra, note 2.
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There might be some reason to doubt whether or not this general
test is applicable to insane delusions,9 particularly since a testator may
very well not be incapacitated by any general mental deficiency which
presumably would require a satisfaction of the formula, and yet the
will may be denied probate on the ground that the testator lacked
testamentary capacity by virtue of insane delusions.' 0 However, very
respectable authority exists to the effect that the insane delusion is
covered by the general test," and it would seem to be of little more
than academic interest in any event, since the Wisconsin Court has
never applied this test as such to an insane delusion situation but rather
promulgates more specific considerations as will be seen.
Insane delusions pose a difficult definitional problem. Bearing in
mind that any definition will fall far short of conclusiveness, Professor
Atkinson's relatively concise definition is felt to be useful as a starting
point.
"An insane delusion must be one to which the testator ad-
heres against evidence, argument, and reason. It is a belief,
due to mental disease, in a state of facts which does not exist
and which no rational person would believe to exist. It is not
proper, however, to apply the test of whether an average or
normal man would harbor the delusion. It is rather a question
of whether the belief is so extravagant, fanciful or preposterous
as to indicate mental disease. On the other hand, the belief
need not be something impossible in the nature of things in
order to constitute an insane delusion."12
Because of the difficulties experienced in attempting to clearly
delineate the bounds of insane delusions, it is almost inevitable that
related occurrences should, on occasion, become confused with the
insane delusion.' 3 These related occurrences shall be termed highly
erroneous beliefs for the sake of clarity in this article, although there
has been no uniform terminology utilized by the courts. It will be the
purpose of this article to ascertain the legal14 distinction between insane
9 In view of the dissenting opinion in Will of Williams, 186 Wis. 160, 202 N.W.
314 (1925) ; also see Will of Lundquist, 205 Wis. 667, 238 N.W. 861 (1931) ;
Will of Russell, 257 Wis. 510, 44 N.W.2d 231 (1950). But see Estate of Knut-
son, 201 Wis. 526, 230 N.W. 617 (1930).
10 Ballantine v. Proudfoot, 62 Wis. 216, 22 N.W. 392 (1885) ; Will of Elbert, 244
Wis. 175, 11 N.W.2d 626 (1934) ; Estate of Week, 247 Wis. 197, 19 N.W.2d 184
(1944).
11 Will of Shanks, 172 Wis. 621, 179 N.W. 747 (1920), quoted in Will of Elbert,
supra, note 10; Insane Delusion as Invalidating a Will, 175 A.L.R. 885 (1948);
Atkinson, WILLS §52.
12 Atkinson, WILLS §52 at p. 244.
13 Confusion may arise because some of the courts speak of obsessions, hallucina-
tions, monomania, and illusions, as synonyms for insane delusions; at other
times, some of these same terms may refer to highly erroneous beliefs.
14 No attempt shall be made to consider the medical aspects or classifications. As
stated by the court in Will of McGovern, 241 Wis. 99, at 106, 3 N.W.2d 717
(1942):
"In determining whether the testator was under the control of insane de-
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delusions and highly erroneous beliefs in Wisconsin, in the various
fields in which cases have arisen to date.
I. SCIENTIFIc BELIEFS
Although only one major Wisconsin case has evolved in this area,
the Chafin Will case,15 it has been cited with such frequency and
covers such a diversity of acts, that standing alone it is fairly adequate.
The testator apparently harbored a rather high regard for his inventive
ability. He felt that he could invent an instrument which would indi-
cate the presence of valuable mineral deposits (this case was, of
course, in the pre-uranium era) ; he persisted in attempts to contrive
a machine which would defy the laws of nature by operating on a
perpetual motion theory; and the testator expressed his desire to Presi-
dent Lincoln to develop some torpedoes or other instruments of de-
struction with which to demolish the Confederate fleets and armies.
Nor was the testator's professed technical prowess confined to the
practical level. He also argued that the sun revolved around the earth
rather than the earth revolving on its axis; astronomical determinations
of the distance from the earth to the sun were denied; and he thought
that rain could be caused by the firing of cannons. All of these facts
were held to constitute harmless erroneous beliefs in a well reasoned
decision, in which Justice Lyon enunciated several fundamental princi-
ples by which erroneous beliefs and insane delusions can be separated.
"As a general rule the insane or partially insane do not reason upon
the subjects of their hallucinations or delusions."'16 Here, the testator's
odd beliefs were all the result of reasoning. For example, he reasoned
that the earth was not revolving because if an object is thrown directly
overhead, it will return to its very spot of origin, therefore, the earth
cannot be moving. His theory that rain could be caused by the firing
of cannons was based upon his understanding that all the great battles
in history had been followed by precipitation. And so it proceeded
with all of his beliefs. "His premise was correct, but his conclusions
therefrom erroneous."' 7
Secondly, it is generally impossible "... to convince the insane of
the absurdity of their delusions by any arguments or actual tests, how-
ever conclusive they may be to a person of sound mind.""' In the in-
stant case, the testator would readily abandon any of his somewhat
unusual theories when a practical test demonstrated their error.
lusions or obsession no confusion need arise from the opinion of experts re-
garding the exact nature of the mental disorder; it is not the function of the
court as a trier of fact to diagnose the exact nature of the mental disease or
incapacity but to determine whether such incapacity did in fact exist and if so
whether it was such as to prevent testator from drawing the will."
15 32 Wis. 558 (1873).
16 Id., at 566.
17 Ibid.
is Ibid.
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The final guide proffered by the Court is probably of less value
than the prior two, but is, nontheless, worthy of note:
"The really insane are usually subject to sudden changes
from one delusion to another. True, this does not always happen,
but where the patient is suffering under a settled, long continued
delusion, there will seldom be any difficulty in ascertaining
whether it is really an insane delusion, or merely an erroneous
opinion based upon false reasoning or insufficient evidence. If
a man really believes that he is made of glass, or that he is the
Christ, or that he is dead, and persists in the opinion, we readily
conclude that he is the victim of hallucination or insane delusion,
because such opinions are inconsistent with the condition of
sanity. But we can draw no such conclusion from the mere
belief in witches, ghosts, dreams or spiritual manifestations, or
in strange and absurd views on scientific or religious subjects,
because such opinions are consistent with sanity. We must
find stronger evidence than these of a diseased mind, before
we can pronounce the man insane who believes in these ab-
surdities."' 9
This pronouncement would seem to be of dubious value in dis-
tinguishing insane delusions from highly erroneous beliefs in the event
of a consistent, long continued belief, since in effect the court is saying
that these are examples of insane delusions because they are insane
delusions. Furthermore, it is doubtful if the specific examples pre-
sented can be relied upon to be insane delusions even if one of them
should arise in an actual case. In order for a belief to constitute an
insane delusion, it is necessary that it materially affect the will, i.e.,
that the will would have been different but for the insane delusion. 20
It is difficult, therefore, to imagine a highly erroneous scientific belief
which might constitute an insane delusion in that it is unlikely that any
such belief would materially influence the testator in his dispository
scheme unless he willed a share of his estate in the furtherance of
some absurd idea.
II. SPIRITUALISM1
The testator in Will of J. B. Smith,21 professed a belief in mediums
and communications with the other world. He claimed to have contacts
from his deceased wife on a few occasions, and made some grain
investments based upon information from the other world. He also
19 Id., at 566-567.
20 Will of Shanks, supra, note 11: "It is not a question whether testator had
general testamentary capacity, for many persons laboring under insane de-
lusions may be competent to make a will (Will of Cole, 49 Wis. 179, 5 N.W.
346), but whether the insane delusion under which the testator suffered ma-
terially affected the will he made. In other words, is it reasonably certain that
but for the insane delusion his wife would have received a materially larger
devise? If that is reasonably certain, then mental capacity is sufficiently shown
to invalidate the will made." Quoted in part in Will of Ebert, supra, note 10.
2152 Wis. 543, 8 N.W. 616 (1881).
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preferred news of current events via the medium circuit rather than
newspaper accounts. In the trial court, a jury found the testator
laboring under insane delusions, but the Supreme Court set aside this
finding as against the clear preponderance of evidence. There were
two key factors which apparently led the court to this result. The
testator believed that there were two kinds of spirits- good spirits,
and bad spirits. He had a novel, but effective means of distinguishing
the two: if the spirit agreed with the testator's feelings on the subject,
it was a good spirit; if not, it was a bad spirit. Hence, it would seem
that his belief in spirits actually had little influence on him, since even
in their absence he undoubtedly would have done the same things. As
such, these convictions lacked the materiality element which must
accompany an insane delusion. Secondly, once the newspaper accounts
became reasonably certain, he would accept their validity over the
information received from the mystical couriers. The court empha-
sized the significance of this fact, and it seems extremely similar
to one of the premises of the Chafin decision. 22
The Chafin Will Case, supra, also involved some spiritualistic
aspects. There the testator expressed faith in clairvoyants, fortune-
tellers, mediums, impressions derived from dreams, and witchcraft;
and induced by the influence of some of these, he journeyed into
New York, Pennsylvania, Michigan and Iowa in search of valuable
minerals and hidden treasures. The court quite summarily pronounced
these absurdities not to constitute insane delusions, because opinions
of this nature may be consistent with sanity.
Actually, there is little more the court could have done. It is a
field dominated by speculation and is not susceptible of adequate proof
or contradiction. 23 A belief can not be a delusion if in accord with
reality, and who is to establish reality in this realm? Consequently,
spiritualistic beliefs must, in all but the most unusual cases, be afforded
a legal sanctuary from the insane delusion attack. 24
Ill. DOMESTIC CONFLICTS
Imputations of unchastity and illegitimacy. There is only one
case in Wisconsin wherein the testator declared his wife unchaste and
his children illegitimate, in which the court upheld the validity of the
will.2 5 Apparently there was a total lack of evidence on the subject.
22 Supra, note 18.
23 1 Page, WILLS §149, states: "No good reason can be given for the contention
that a belief of this sort establishes insanity. Such a belief is often based
upon evidence of some sort, and while this evidence might not convince most
persons, a belief which is based thereon can not be classed as an insane de-
lusion. Where not based on evidence of some sort, a belief of this character in-
volves questions of abstract speculation upon which evidence is not obtainable;
and a belief of this sort can not be classed as a insane delusion."
24 175 A.L.R., op. cit., supra, note 11, at 944; 57 AM. JUR., WILLS §86.
25 Chafin Will Case, supra, note 15.
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The court stated that there was a presumption of chastity and legiti-
macy, but then completely emasculated the presumption by hypo-
thesizing that there may have been some facts and circumstances
which lead the testator to this belief and since this possibility was not
negated, it would not do to find the existence of an insane delusion.
This result would seem to be legitimate, but upon a different rationale.
There would be in such a case, conflicting presumptions: on the one
hand, there is the presumption of chastity and legitimacy; on the other.
there is a presumption of sanity and testamentary capacity, 26 with the
burden upon the contestant to overcome that presumption by clear,
convincing, and satisfactory evidence.2 T It would seem, therefore, that
where no evidence is introduced upon the matter, that the contestant
has not met his burden of proof, and the will should stand notwith-
standing the presumption detrimental to the cause of the proponents.
In Will of Behl, 2s the court acknowledged the presumption of the
validity of the will, but held that the presumption could be overcome
by evidence that the imputations were wholly groundless and false,
which is certainly not inconsistant with the previous case. An even
stronger case for insane delusions was presented in Will of Ebenezer
W. Cole,29 wherein the charges were once again utterly groundless and
false; and quite significantly, no reasoning or expostulation could
shake the testator's belief. Although the absence of any attempt to
contradict the testator's groundless suspicions of his wife's infidelity
would quite obviously not be fatal to the presence of an insane de-
lusion in view of the Behm case, supra, its presence would presumably
greatly aid the contestant in establishing the presence of an insane
delusion. 0
Undoubtedly, Will of Mc Govern,31 is the leading Wisconsin case in
the field presently under consideration. The testator was suffering
from a sexual neurasthenia prior to his mariage to a young lady some
thirteen years his junior. However, within a few weeks after the mar-
riage, he overcame the impediment and consumated the marital relation.
Shortly thereafter, the testator began to acuse his wife of infidelity
although her conduct had been above reproach and her reputation was
unimpeachable. A child was born, but the testator denied his paternity
because the infant had red hair whereas no member of his family had
ever had red hair. The accusations continued, and testator's actions
became more radical. At night he would inspect the house in search
26 Estate of Bickner, 259 Wis. 425, 49 N.W.2d 404 (1951), quoted in Estate of
Bauer, 264, Wis. 556, 59 N.W.2d 481 (1952), and cases there cited.
27 Estate of Bickner, supra, note 26, quoted in Will of Wright, 266 Wis. 89, 62
N.W.2d 409 (1953).28 187 Wis. 10, 203 N.W. 718 (1925).
29 49 Wis. 179, 5 N.W. 346 (1880).
30 Chafin Will Case, supra, note 18.
31 Supra, note 14.
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of his wife's hidden lovers, and on one occasion drove a young man
from his office apparently because testator believed him to be the father
of his child, although the bewildered victim had escorted testator's wife
neither before nor after her marriage. Subsequently, his wife became
pregnant again, but the testator persisted in his belief of impotency.
Eventually, the young mother could endure no more and took her child
to live in an environment isolated from the rantings of the testator.
Upon these facts, the court had little difficulty in determining that the
testator was suffering from insane delusions. The accusations were
shown to be utterly groundless and false. A priest, the brother of the
testator's wife, tried to reason with testator, but to no avail. The court
also launched into an attack upon the testator's reasoning, which adds
an important qualification to the rule that the delusioned person does
not reason upon the subject of his delusion :32
"If testator had reason to believe he was sterile his belief
that the child was not his would have some basis to rest upon
but an inability to refrain from believing in the existence of a
certain fact when it is known not to exist must come from 'an
uncontrollable urge to follow a thought' disregarding all existing
facts. If a man says that he cannot raise his right hand and
then proceeds to raise it, he is fooling or, if he still believes that
he cannot do it the obsession is controlling him. No other man
had access to testator's wife. She became pregnant twice. The
existence of these facts take testator out of the class of im-
potents and places him in the class of those controlled by an
obsession. '33
An interesting materiality question was also posed by the Mc-
Govern case. The contestant - testator's red haired child - was visited
by testator on only two occasions, both of which resulted in a display
of mutual indifference. The trial court grasped this facet of the rela-
tionship as evidence that the testator was not influenced by his errone-
ous belief, but rather disinherited the contestant simply because any
vestige of parental affection which might have prompted the testator
to provide for his child was lacking. The Supreme Court, however,
probed more deeply into the causal connection, and concluded that the
indifference was the result of the illegitimacy charge, and, therefore,
the insane delusion did ultimately affect the testator's disposition.34
32 Chafin Will Case, supra, note 16.
33 Will of McGovern, supra, note 14, 241 Wis. at 109.34 The court stated: "As in the beginning the obsession was sufficient to cause
the testator to indulge in such a course of conduct as to drive the normal ob-jects of his affection from his home, so it stood through the years as a bar-
rier to any hopes of reuniting the ties of fatherhood, and at the close of his
life this obsession compelled testator to deny, by the very silence of his will,
rights to the one whose claim was the greatest to his affection, his own daugh-
ter, and whose claim he would doubtless have recognized at the time he wrote
the letter in 1927 had he been able to control the obsession." Id., at 111.
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Hence, it seems clear that the requisite causal connection need not be
immediate, and something in the nature of a chain of causation will
suffice.
Two interesting deviations appear in Will of Shanks.3 5 Once
again the testator's charges of infidelity to his spouse were utterly
groundless; but in addition thereto, the gentleman which testator
selected as his wife's partner in iniquity, was himself of unquestion-
able integrity and virtue-a fact which seemed to have had no little
influence on the court. Thus, where the testator specifies the allegedly
nefarious third party it would seem that evidence of his moral timber
might be useful in overcoming the presumption favoring testamentary
capacity. The testator, however, attempted in his will to correct his
slanderous errors. He stated that the charge was made in a fit of anger,
was not true, and an apology therefor was offered.36 The court dis-
counted this attempt to eradicate the insane delusion:
"Were it not for the well known propensity of insane per-
sons, or those suffering from insane delusions, to negative their
true state of mind or to be unaware of it, more importance
might be attached to the statement in the will.13 7
Allegations of criminality. The problem here is very similar to
that encountered in allegations of unchastity and illegitimacy. In
Estate of Week,3s the testatrix wrote several letters suggesting that
somebody was stealing from her, but the suspected party was never
disclosed. There was an absence of evidence on the matter. As a
result, the court decided that the testatrix may or may not have had
adequate reasons for her suspicion. In such a state of affairs, the
contestant failed to meet his burden of proof, and the will should be
admitted to probate.
Where there is some evidence that the testator's beliefs are ground-
less and false, and particularly where the testator cannot be reasoned
out of his belief, then the court seems to readily find an insane de-
35 Supra, note 11.
Be The testator interjected the following statement in his will: "I have always
been a man of violent temper and a jealous disposition. That some time in the
fall of 1918 I became very angry with my wife and in the heat of temper
wrongfully accused her of infidelity. I was sorry that I did this and imme-
diately told her that I did not believe such things, and I wish it to be under-
stood in this my last will and testament that such statements were made while
violently angry and jealous, and I am sorry that I made those statements. I
wish to further state that I have no feeling of enmity or jealousy against my
good wife, and that when my temper sufficiently cooled I knew that I had
wrongfully accused her, and wish to state that I believe her to be perfectly
honorable and a good, virtuous wife, and that my feelings towards her are in
no way bitter at this time, and I have tried by this will to properly take care of
and leave enough to protect her as long as she shall live." Id., 172 Wis. at
623-624.
37 d., at 624.
38Supra, note 10.
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lusion.39 Conversely, where there is some evidence to support the
testator's belief, then it is difficult if not impossible to show an insane
delusion. In the Estate of Bickner,40 the testator watched the con-
testants remove some of his property under somewhat ambiguous
circumstances. Presumably, the property was in fact a gift, but the
court felt that there was some basis for the testator to believe it was
being stolen. The significance of this element was portrayed by the
court's quotation from 68 C. J., Wills, p. 433 sec. 30:
"... a mere mistaken belief or an erroneous or unjust con-
clusion is not an insane delusion if there is some foundation in
fact or some basis on which the mental operation of the testator
may rest, even though the basis may be regarded by others as
wholly insufficient. Similarly, even though the testator may be
in error in his reasoning, undue or unnatural prejudice or aver-
sion, if based on any kind of reasoning is not an insane de-
lusion." 41
If taken literally, this edict might well lead to a precarious position.
If any sort of basis will suffice, then presumably even a basis which
only an insane person would accept would endow the person with
testamentary capacity, which would indeed be a strange anomaly. The
Court subsequently quotes 42 from Page's treatise43 which seems to
limit the operation of this principle to situations where a sane person
might draw the same conclusion as did the testator.44
The question of materiality is pertinent to this category of insane
delusions, as it is to any other. However, the court manifested some
liberality in this area by indicating that if there is a groundless allega-
tion of criminality, an estrangement between the testator and the
individual charged, and no other grounds are shown to explain the
alienation, then it will be assumed that the insane delusion was the
cause thereof.45
Personal aversion. In an early case46 in which the testatrix
conceived a groundless antipathy for her husband, the court apparently
conceded to the testatrix the right to like or dislike anyone, with or
without any reason, with no fear of such action being labeled an insane
delusion.
This early approach seemed to be discredited-at least by in-
9 Will of Ebenezer W. Cole, supra, note 29.40 Supra, note 26.
41 Id., 259 Wis. at 432.
42 Id., at 433.
43 1 Page, WILLs §144: "In order to be an insane delusion the mistake must be one
which is not based upon evidence; or at least without any evidence from which
a sane man could draw the conclusion which forms the delusion."
44 To similar effect, see 175 A.L.R., op. cit., sopra, note 11, at 914.
45 Ballantine v. Proudfoot, supra, note 10; Will of Elbert, supra, note 10.
46 In the Matter of the Will of Sarah M. Blakely, supra, note 7.
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ference - in Estate of Boston,4 7 where the testator eliminated his
daughter from his will because of a fairly senseless, typical quarrel
involving the services of a carpenter. Here there were circumstances
explaining the testator's move, and this was held to be fatal to the
presence of an insane delusion, even though the cause of the conflict
was at best trivial. However, the court suggested that the result might
be different if there were no reasons at all to explain the aversion.4 8
In a subsequent holding, 9 the situation was clarified by a reversion
to the early rule, although the case did involve a dispute which was
anything but groundless. In short, any attempt to convert personal
aversion into an insane delusion might well encounter extreme diffi-
culty even though there is either no demonstrable basis or no adequate
foundation for the antipathy.50
IV. WILL PROVISIONS
Unnatural wills. Every insane delusion situation involves an
unnatural will in a sense, in view of the materiality requirement. That
is, the will must to a degree be the product of the insane delusion, and
as such, it is unnatural.
If there exists some reason aside from the insane delusion to
account for the challenged distribution, the validity of the instrument
will be upheld. 51 Probably the reason must be a sensible one,52 but
clearly that does not require the facts supporting the testator's belief
to be true in fact.53 Several cases indicate that a reason must be found
in order to avert the likelihood of a successful insane delusion attack,
54
47253 Wis. 8, 33 N.W.2d 257 (1947).
48 "While the circumstances which apparently prompted his change of attitude
toward Thada are trivial, they serve to explain his change of mind in that re-
gard. Whether or not he was fair or right in his estimate of the worthiness
of the Warners to be beneficiaries after the September transactions, the essen-
tial fact is clear that when he dictated and later executed his last will his
attitude was not so without reason as to amount to a delusion or obsession.
Having the capacity, he had the right to dispose of his property as he pleased."
Id., 253 Wis. at 13-14.
49 Will of Russell, supra, note 9.
50 The court quoted 1 Page, WILLS §146, which upholds this position, but did so
only in part, to wit: "The fact that testator dislikes certain of the natural ob-jects of his bounty does not establish an insane delusion; even if such dislike
is based upon some reason, although it may be an unjust one." Id., 257 Wis.
at 522-523. However, it is felt that even the abridgment utilized by the court
supports the suggested contention.
51 Chafin Will Case, supra, note 15; Will of J. B. Smith, supra, note 21; Estate
of Wegner, supra, note 2.
52 Will of Garrecht, 195 Wis. 596, 219 N.W. 378 (1928).
53 Will of Lundquist, supra, note 9; Estate of Bauer, supra, note 26.
54 Estate of Boston, supra, note 47; Will of Williams, 256 Wis. 338, 41 N.W.2d
191 (1949). In Will of Lundquist, supra, note 9, 205 Wis. at 676, the court em-
phatically declared: "There is nothing in the record which reasonably justifies
her hatred of her husband's brothers; nothing to show that her obsessions as to
them had any basis in fact; nothing on which to base her judgment that they
coveted her property, desired her to make a will in their favor, or that they
would get it away from her husband in case she left it to him outright; noth-
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but mere favoritism of one expectant heir over another will suffice.i 5
As previously noted, the contestant has the burden of proving the
insane delusion by clear, satisfactory, and convincing proof. Where
the evidence extrinsic to the will is insufficient to demonstrate the
insane delusion, the contestant ought to be able to utilize any unnatural
provisions in the will in furthering his claim. 56 Consequently, in a close
case the unnaturalness of the will might well be the determining factor.
The Court, on occasion, has stated that the justice of the will should
not influence the court in its determination.5 T It is doubtful if this
amounts to any more than lip service of the weakest variety. By
emphasizing the importance of some reason to explain what might
otherwise be considered an unnatural will, the court is at least indirectly
suggesting that the justice of the will is a valid consideration. But
this conclusion is not based upon indirection alone. Numerous cases
speak of the justness of the will in unmistakable language, and appear
to impart great significance to it.59
Incoherent wills. If the testator were under the influence of an
insane delusion, it would be entirely possible for his incapacitating
condition to manifest itself upon the face of the will itself. The testa-
tor in Evenson v. RustO° provided that the residue of his estate was
to be divided equally between A and B or their heirs, and C and D,
or their heirs. The alleged peculiarity of this provision lay in the fact
that A had not only predeceased the testator, but had in fact died prior
to the execution of the will. In view of other weighty evidence which
established the mental capacity of the testator, the court felt that
testator may have considered the utilized language more convenient
than a specific designation of A's heirs, which would not be inconsistent
with a perfect awareness of A's death and hence not necessarily indi-
cative of any delusion.
Will of Jacobson"' involved a more complex fact situation. The
testator apparently feared that his divorced wife would in some manner
acquire a share in his estate unless he precluded such an undesirable
ing, of course, to show that they would get it away from him in some manner
even if she left him only a life estate therein."
55 Will of Emerson, 183 Wis. 437, 198 N.W. 441 (1924); Will of Truehl, 220
Wis. 137, 264 N.W. 254 (1936) ; Will of Russell, supra, note 9. But see Will of
Behm, supra, note 28.
56 Will of Emerson, supra, note 55, 183 Wis. at 445; "When the evidence as to lack
of mental capacity or the exercise of undue influence is not clear and satis-
factory, the fact as to whether the will may be termed a natural one is of
great significance." 57 AM. JUR., WILLS §83.
7 In the Matter of the Will of Sarah M. Blakely, supra, note 7, 48 Wis. at 301;
Estate of Bickner, supra, note 26, 259 Wis. at 433.
58 Supra, notes 51, 52, and 54.
59 Will of Shanks, supra, note 11; Estate of Knutson, supra, note 9; Will of
Lundquist, supra, note 9; Estate of Bauer, supra, note 26.
60 Evenson v. Rust, 152 Wis. 113, 139 N.W. 766 (1913).
01 Will of Jacobson, 223 Wis. 508, 270 N.W. 923 (1937).
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result by testamentary maneuvers. Therefore, the testator provided
in his will that his daughter, Joyce, and son, Marion, were to receive
the income from his property-but only after his wife's death. The
contestants offered the testator's misconception of his divorced spouse's
interest in his estate as evidence of an insane delusion, but the effort
proved futile. "Erroneous views of the law are not 'delusions' such
as to void wills. A 'delusion' such as to void a will must be 'insane
delusion'. '62 Coupled with the testator's erroneous legal view was a
will studded with confusion. After misspelling the son's name, the will
went on to provide:
"... and at the death of either of my daughters, the one-
half of my said property shall be equally divided between their
children, share and share alike, so that the children of Joyce
Ferguson receive one-half of my said estate and the children
of Marian Jacobson receive one-half of the estate, the corpus
of said estate to be divided between and vest in my said grand-
children within twenty-one (21) years from the death of their
said mothers."63 (emphasis added).
In short, there were four rather glaring errors appearing in the will.
The court found a satisfactory explanation in every instance. Testator
had two wills drawn. The first scrivener apparently inferred that
testator had two daughters rather than one daughter and one son,
and hence spelled the son's name "Marian," in the feminine, rather
than "Marion" as used for the masculine gender. By inadvertance,
the testator missed this error which in turn mislead the second scri-
vener who drew the contested will, although the latter was cognizant
of the true situation. Testator desired the remainder to vest in his
grandchildren, which were the children of the daughter only since the
son was without issue. The court was of the opinion that the testator
and the scrivener were concentrating on this objective, and as a result
the errors ("daughters" was used instead of "children"; "mothers"
instead of "parents") escaped unnoticed.
Quite possibly these cases raise more problems than solutions. One
thing seems clear - in view of the courts success in explaining the
misleading phraseology in the testamentary instrument - it is unlikely,
at least in the absence of a highly peculiar will, that an incoherent will
standing alone would be sufficient to convince the court that the testator
was disabled by any insane delusions. However, it would seem reason-
able to presume under the Evenson decision,"4 that in a close case
evidence of an incoherent will would attain considerable importance.65
As yet, no case has arisen in Wisconsin in which the will displays the
62Id., 223 Wis. at 511.
63 Id., at 512-513.
64 Supra, note 60, at 115.
r5 175 A.L.R., op. cit., supra, note 11, at 970.
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same erroneous belief as that demonstrated by the testator outside of
the will. Hence, the effect of such an eventuality can scarcely escape
the confines of mere conjecture, but it is difficult to imagine the testa-
mentary provisions being unimportant in such a case.
V. ECCENTRICITIES
Eccentricities are deviations from normal conduct or behavior. In
a sense, therefore, both insane delusions and highly erroneous beliefs
might well be considered eccentricities in every instance; but eccen-
tricity, as here used, is limited to the ordinary connotation of the term
and excludes the matters previously examined.
Eccentricities per se do not amount to insane delusions.66 Simply
because the testator was immoral,67 or beat on the fence with a stick,
or occasionally awoke the family to inform them of the presence of a
non-existant person,68 or was subject to frequent crying and laughing
spells, 69 or talked to himself, or poked imaginary people out of a tree
with a stick,70 or was abusive and creul towards his animals or ima-
gined noises, or was forgetful,71 does not establish the existence of an
insane delusion. As stated in the Will of Russell:
"Every person has slight peculiarities of his own, which
never cause any suspicion of his testamentary capacity. It is
only when they become pronounced by contrast with those about
him that they become known as eccentricities, and are invoked
to discredit his testamentary capacity. Eccentricity has no effect
on testamentary capacity; and wills of persons who are highly
eccentric, and in some cases eccentric to the verge of insanity
have been upheld. This is especially true where eccentricity is
due, not to any form of mental derangement, but to vanity,
selfishness and the like .... 72
Nor are the infirmities of old age,73 or physical afflictions,7 4 or
criminal responsibility,75 or contractual incapacity76 to be confused
with insane delusions. The former may well exist in the absence of the
latter.
Although eccentricities in and of themselves are insufficient to
66 1 Page, VTILLS §148; 94 C.J.S., WILLS §22.
67 Will of Golz, 190 Wis. 524, 209 N.W. 704 (1926).
6s In re Butler's Will, 110 Wis. 70, 85 N.W. 678 (1901).
69 In the Matter of the Will of Sarah M. Blakely, supra, note 7.
70 Estate of Wegner, supra, note 2.
71 Estate of Knutson, supra, note 9.
72 Supra, note 9, at 523.
73 Estate of Wegner, supra, note 2; Will of Williams, supra, note 9; Will of Mc-
Leisch, 209 Wis. 417, 245, N.W. 197 (1932) ; Will of Jacobson, supra, note 61;
Will of Washburn, 248 Wis. 467, 22 N.W.2d 512 (1945); Estate of Bauer,
supra, note 26.
74 Estate of Bean, 159 Wis. 67, 149 N.W. 745 (1914) : Will of Jacobson, stlpra,
note 61; Will of Szperka, 254 Wis. 153, 158, 35 N.W. 209, 911 (1948) (1949).
75 1 Page, WILLS §129.
76 1 Page, WILLS §131.
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establish the presence of an insane delusion, they are, of course, perti-
nent evidence as regards general testamentary incapacity.77
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Falsity is, of course, a sine qua non of the insane delusion. But in
and of itself, falsity is of no particular value in distinguishing an in-
sane delusion from a highly erroneous belief since falsity is but the
genus of which both are species.
In the event the incorrect conclusion has some basis in fact or is
the product of a reasoning process, the belief is then merely erroneous
and not an insane delusion. 7 However, the purported rationale prob-
ably must be coherent, that is, a logical error rather than an absurd
deduction ;79 and it is likely that the basis or foundation for the belief
must be of some sensible substance to qualify as a highly erroneous be-
lief. 0 Some caution must be exercised in applying this differentiating
element since there are fields such as abstract speculationss or personal
aversions,8 2 which by their very nature either defy the application of
this particular test, or at least render its value questionable.
If there was an attempt to rebut the fallacious conviction, it is of
considerable importance since a refusal to reject a demonstrated error
is indicative of an insane delusion. 3 Unfortunately, evidence of this
nature is frequently unavailable where the belief escapes the confines
of any realistic semblance because few would venture to undertake
such a hopeless task -but presumably if the case were that patent,
the contestant should be able to successfully establish the insane de-
lusion without it. On the other hand, the likelihood of an attempted
rebuttal of the erroneous view should be much greater in a close case,
wherein evidence of this factor might more significantly contribute to
the contestant's cause.84
Notwithstanding all of the previously mentioned considerations,
there remains one element whose presence is indispensible to the
existence of an insane delusion - materiality.8 5 Even though the be-
bief was obviously false, foundationless, and irrebutable, if it failed to
affect the testamentary disposition it could not qualify as an insane
delusion and would have to be discarded as a harmless, highly errone-
ous belief, although, of course, it would be pertinent evidence on the
question of general mental capacity.8 6  JOHN A. HANSEN
77 Will of Williams, supra, note 9; Atkinson, WILLs, §52; 1 Page, WILLs, §148; 94
C.J.S., WILLS §22.
78 Supra, notes 16, 41, 47 and 51.
79 Supra, notes 43 and 44.
80 Supra, notes 34, 43, 44, and 52.
81 Supra, notes 23 and 24.
s° Supra, notes 46, 49 and 50.
83 Supra, note 18.
s4 Supra, note 30.
85 Supra, note 20.
so Supra, note 77.
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